Despite prolonged sermons (e.g., Moscovici & Lecuyer, 1972) and brief laments (e.g., Smith, 1972) to the contrary, research on group induced revisions in individual choice-the ill-named "risky shift"-has in fact progressed to where critical experimentation seems possible. The issues at hand in this area have to do with the necessary and sufficient conditions ' for producing such shifts. There are two distinct theoretical views. One stresses interpersonal comparisons and the other, persuasive argumentation-reflecting the common distinction between normative and informational processes ( Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) .
Interpersonal comparison theories also often referred to as value theories (Levinger & Schneider, 1969; Jellison & Riskind, 1970; Pruitt, 1971b) , all argue that the shift is due to normative processes. For instance, according to Brown ( X365) , upon comparing himself with others and learning his choice is relatively moderate, a group member experiences some distressful emotions-fear of disapproval, loss in selfesteem, etc. This unfortunate state of affairs is said to come about because the member believes such moderation does not reflect adequate adherence to widely cherished social values. To avoid further discomfort, this individual abandons his initial choice for one he thinks will demonstrate proper adherence, a choice which will make him at least as extreme as most other members. A more detailed review of these approaches to the choice-shift effect appears in Cartwright ( 1971 ), Pruitt (1971a ,b), and Vinokur ( 1971 .
Persuasive-arguments theory (St. Jean, 1970; Vinokur, 1971; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974) attributes shifts in choice to informational processes which commonly occur during individual and group problem-solving. It assumes that a particular decision brings to mind a set of standard arguments in support of the various alternatives among which the person must choose. A member's initial choice is said to be due to the kind of persuasive arguments available to him. The shifts in choice following discussion are assumed to result from the sharing of arguments which were only partially available to the average member prior to discussion. A more thorough presentation of this approach can be found in Burnstein and Vinokur ( 1973) and in Vinokur and Burnstein (1974) .
Two main research strategies have been used to examine interpersonal comparison and persuasive argumentation processes. One consists of experiments which try to determine if shifts in choice occur when either comparison processes or persuasive argumentation is prevented from occurring.
Suffice to say that shifts are obtained following persuasive argumentation even when interpersonal comparison processes are minimized or precluded; they rarely occur, however, if interpersonal comparison can take place but persuasive argumentation is minimized or precluded (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973; Burnstein et al., 1973; Clark et al., 1971; St. Jean, 1970; Wallach & Kogan, 1965) . While a few studies have obtained shifts in choice under the latter conditions, in each case they have been rather attenuated ones (e.g., Clark & Willems, 1969; Teger & Pruitt, 1967 as most others (Jellison & Riskind, 1970) . This yearning to outshine in turn would lead to shifts in choice among relatively moderate individuals once they have had an opportunity to compare themselves with others.
The finding that admired choices tend to be more extreme than one's own choice is readily explained by the Levinger and Schneider (1969) or the Pruitt (1971b) version of interpersonal comparison theory, both of which assume that an individual's decision is the result of a compromise between group norms and abstract ideals or extreme exemplars, Also, Brown's formulation is vague enough to encompass the effect with no great strain. For instance, he might assert that actually choosing usually involves competing values (e.g., be bold but not foolhardy); while merely admiring is not so constrained. Thus, admiration is likely to be an unalloyed expression of the dominant value engaged by the decision (riskiness on decisions known to shift toward risk and cautiousness on those given to shifts toward caution).
There are, however, other findings involving these discrepancies which do not make a great deal of sense in terms of the value adherence hypothesis. For instance, in the original Levinger and Schneider (1969) study, the self-ideal discrepancy appears to be a rather unreliable guide on cautious items (but not on risky items). In addition, the order in which the judgments are made has powerful effects, the discrepancies being much reduced when the choice of others or the ideal choice is made before one's own choice (McCauley, Kogan, & Teger, 1971; Myers, 1973a) . On the other hand interpersonal comparison processes, according to these researchers, imply the reverse would occur. Being concerned about others' choices or about admirable choices before getting down to one's own preferences will make the value-adherence implications of the choice comparison (own vs others, or own vs admired) more salient than being unconcerned about these matters until after settling one's own preferences-especially since the person probably does not foresee that he will be asked immediately afterward to consider what others would choose or what choice he admires. Thus the discrepancy between own and others' or admired choices should be greater if the former is made after rather than before the latter, which is not at all what was found.
Finally, and most importantly, in their recent work Lamm, Trommsdorff, and Rost-Schaude (1972) find no relationship between the magnitude of the shifts and the self-other discrepancies, although a positive relationship should be obtained according to the value-adherence hypothesis. In spite of their previous research (Lamm, Schaude, & Trommsdorff, 1971 ) these authors are now convinced that self-other discrepancies have no connection with the choice shift, a possibility also suggested by Cartwright in his review ( 1971) . According to the latter author, self-other discrepancies and choice shifts may well be causally unrelated, as the findings in Lamm et al. (1972) strongly suggest. Indeed, each effect may have its own separate and distinct causes which have nothing to do with value-adherence.
If this is correct and if similar doubt can be raised in respect to the self-ideal discrepancy-that the latter is not a manifestation of value-adherence processes and/or is causally unrelated to shifts in choice-the remaining support for interpersonal comparison explanations is severely undermined.
Our paper contains two studies dealing with these issues. The first concerns the self-other discrepancy and the second, the self-ideal discrepancy. EXPERIMENT I The finding that an individual's own choice tends to be more extreme than that which he predicts for others is also consistent with at least one reasonably well established principle of social judgment, to wit: the more certain, confident, or intensely held the judgment, the more extreme its expression, say, on scales commonly used in attitude measurement (e.g., Suchman, 1950) . The same type of finding has been obtained in research on the choice-shift, although little has been made of it. Thus, Clausen (1965) observed a positive correlation between extremeness of choice and the individual's confidence in the choice. Similar findings were reported by Burnstein and Katz (1971) . In addition, it is known that people who have made an extreme choice appear more influential and thus probably more confident to others (e.g., Burnstein, 1969; Marquis, 1962) . Finally, Stroebe and Fraser (1971) have demonstrated that confidence in one's choice and extremity of the choice are directly related for items which shift toward risk as well as those which shift toward caution.
It may well be the case, therefore, that an individual selects a more risky course (on items shifting toward risk) or a more cautious one (on items BURNSTEIN, VINOKUR AND PICHEVIN shifting toward caution) than that which he predicts others will choose because he is more confident or certain about his own preference than about the choice of others and not because he wishes to outshine others in adhering to cherished social values.
Method
Subjects and procedure. Forty-eight female undergraduates at the University of Provence ( Aix-en-Provence) participated as part of a course requirement. They were given a booklet labeled "Opinion Questionnaire" which contained five decision items which are standard in this area: number 2 and 8 from Stoner (1968) and number 5, 8, and 11 from the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ) of Kogan and Wallach (1964) , very slightly modified for French subjects. On each item the subject first indicated her own choice of a "risk-level" according to the usual format (see Pruitt, 1971a) , that is, the minimum probability of success she would recommend in order to pursue a relatively attractive but uncertain course of action. She then indicated what in her opinion the majority of other students in psychology at the University of Provence would choose. Next, the subject indicated how confident and certain she was about her own choice and, finally, how confident and certain she was about the choice predicted for others. The latter judgments were made on a six-point scale ranging from "completely confident and certain" (scale value = 1) to "completely unconfident and uncertain" (scale value = 6).
Results
Mean own and others' choices as well as mean confidence ratings on items known to shift toward risk or caution are presented in Table 1 . As in past studies, a subject's own choice tends to be more extreme than the choice he attributes to others. Furthermore, as expected, she is considerably more confident and certain about the former than the latter. Out of the 240 choices made by our subjects, 192 (80%) were ones in which confidence in one's own choice was greater than confidence in the others' choice, 36 (15%) in which individuals were equally confident about own and others' choices, and only 12 (5%) in which they were less confident about own than others' choices. The relationship between cor&dence and the minimum acceptable probability for own and other's choice averaged over items and over probability levels is shown in Fig. 1 . The results for own choice are similar to those obtained by Stroebe and Fraser ( 1971) , that is, individuals are more confident about their own extreme choices than about moderate choices, both on items known to shift toward risk and on those known to shift toward caution, In addition they were generally less certain about the choice predicted for others regardless of its extremity. For purposes of analysis the subjects' mean confidence rating (I? = 1.73) for own extreme choices (those falling between either "1 out of 10" and "3 out of 10" or between "8 out of 10" and "10 out of 10") was compared with their mean confidence rating (x = 3.55) for own moderate choices (those falling between "4 out of 10" and "7 out of lo"). A t-test for correlated means indicates the difference in confidence is significant at the .Ol level. A similar comparison between confidence ratings of extreme and moderate choices attributed to others did not approach traditional levels of statistical significance.
EXPERIMENT II
The discrepancy between what a person chooses and what he admires seems a straightforward indication of value adherence (and, thus, the potential for comparison processes inducing a shift in choice). First, an and Rost-Schaude (1972) found that shifts in choice toward the extreme (risk) is directly related to judgments on activity and potency dimensions, but not to judgments on the evaluative dimension. This suggests that observers may infer something other than valueadherence from extreme choices.
Let us now examine these findings in the light of the persuasivearguments formulation.
Consider the set of CDQ items standard in this area.3 This task has a subject read a description of a hypothetical situation ' in which the "hero" is confronted with a choice between a certain and an uncertain course of action. According to persuasive-arguments theory, choosing a minimum acceptable probability of success for pursuing the uncertain alternative requires the individual to consider arguments for and against the different courses of action, weigh their importance, and even make some inferences based on these ideas and on his familiarity with similar situations. Hence, the individual is literally engaged in probbm-solving rather than in risk-taking, and the arguments which come to mind function as part-solutions to the problem of choice rather than justification for derring-do. Suppose items of the CDQ type are seen as problems to be solved. Then it is reasonable to conjecture that observers may evaluate another's choice largely in terms of its being well or poorly founded. In other words, since there is no objectively correct choice, the evaluation will reflect an inference about the quality of the ideas or the persuasiveness of the arguments which we-and probably observers also-know determined the choice. Thus, an extreme preference may be admired because it is a sign of confidence, which in turn implies to observers that the person has available a large number of persuasive reasons to support his preference. According to persuasive-arguments theory, because the observer is judging the choice as a well or poorly founded solution, it is not surprising that he makes at least as strong inferences about the person's creativity and rationality (e.g., see Jellison & Riskind, 1970) as about his goodness and attractiveness.
In the present study, observers are given two cues about the thinking which has led an individual to make a specific choice-the direction of his choice and the confidence and certainty he expressed in his choice. Upon reading a particular CDQ item, the average observer is likely to think of more arguments in favor of one alternative, that is, for the uncertain alternative, on items which shift toward risk, and for the certain over the uncertain alternative on items which shift toward caution (Silverthorne, 1971; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974) . The observer, therefore, has an idea of which alternative has the most supportive argumentation and, in this specal sense, which is likely to be correct. If the person has selected the correct alternative and is certain about his choice, observers are likely to infer that he has available many good reasons for his choice. As a result, his solution to the dilemma is judged to be of high quality, as worthy of admiration (as is, of course, the person who devised the solution). On the other hand, if the person has selected the incorrect alternative and is uncertain, observers are likely to infer he has little reason for his choice, and his solution is of poor quality. These may be considered as limiting cases. Inference about the nature of the arguments BURNSTEIN, VINOKUR AND PICHEVIN available to the person and the quality of his solution in the two remaining instances-a correct but uncertain choice and an incorrect but certain choice-should fall somewhere between these limiting cases. The critical point to keep in mind is that persuasive-argument theory predicts similar but independent effects for the direction of choice and for confidence in the choice. Interpersonal comparison theories suggest something different. The social value which dominates a choice supposedly is evident from the direction in which the latter shifts following interpersonal comparison. Thus on an item which shifts, say, toward risk, an extremely risky preference (or the person having this preference) is more admirable than a moderate one because the former conforms more to the cherished value. The homage should crescendo when the extremely risky individual is also highly certain and confident about his choice, this being a display of maximal adherence to the value. Consider now the soul who prefers an extremely cautious course of action on an item which shifts toward risk. According to the interpersonal comparison formulation, he should be castigated for rejecting something widely prized; and were he to indicate his rejection is firm, that he is certain and confident about his choice, the castigation should be even greater. Thus, interpersonal comparison theories imply an interaction between the direction of a choicewhether it reflects conformity to or rejection of a widely held value-and certainty or confidence in the choice. That is to say, high confidence in a deviant choice, one which rejects a widely shared social value should lead to maximal disapproval, while high confidence in a conforming choice should lead to maximal approval. Such effects are standard in field and laboratory studies of conformity (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Schachter, 1951) . Nevertheless, this is clearly contrary to the prediction made by persuasive-arguments theory which implies additive (averaging) effects for correctness and confidence (see above). Our second study attempts to determine which of the two predictions is correct. They were arranged in the questionnaire to provide a 2 X 2 x 2 within subject orthogonal factorial design with 2 levels of risk, 2 levels of confidence and 2 levels of item type (i.e., risky vs cautious items). More specifically, for each item, the check mark on the odds scale was either placed on high risk ( 1 or 2 in 10) or on low risk (8 or 9 in lo), and the check mark on the confidence scale was either placed on high confidence (i.e., 10) or on low confidence (i.e., 4). (The complete orthogonal pattern of check marks for the risk and confidence scales appeared once in the four risky items and once in the four cautious items.) The items were assembled in the questionnaire so that each risky item was followed by a cautious item and each item with risky check mark ( 1, 2 in 10) was followed by an item with a cautious check mark (8, 9 in 10). Finally, the order of each specific item in the questionnaire varied so that across subjects, each item appears at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of the questionnaire as frequently as any other item.
In 
Results
A subject's scores on scales belonging to the same semantic dimension were averaged. Along with our two measures of the "well-foundedness" of the choice, this gave 5 dependent variables (evaluation, activity, potency, sincerity, and persuasiveness) with the score of each varying from 1 (low) to 9 (high). A 2 X 2 X 2 X 5 analysis of variance with repeated measures on all factors was performed.
The mean scores are shown in Table 2 . The largest main effect is associated with the confidence factor [ (F( 1,73) = 81.832, p < .OOl], demonstrating that reliably higher evaluations are given if the respondent is certain and confident than if he is uncertain and unconfident, regardless of the direction of the choice. The next strongest effect is the interaction between item type and direction of choice [F( 1,73) = 46.064, p < .OOl] indicating that risky preferences on items known to shift toward risky and cautious preferences on items known to shift toward caution are rated more highly than their respective opposites. An examination of the mean ratings on risky items What is most important is that confidence and correctness (direction of choice) have similar and independent effects, a finding which is contrary to interpersonal comparison theories but totally consistent with persuasive argumentation.
The same is true for results from our analysis of judgements of persuasiveness and sincerity, where again we obtain significant effects for confidence ( persuasiveness : F( 1,73) = 132.083, p < 901; sincerity: F( 1,73) = 25.808, p < .OOl) and for the interaction between direction of choice and item type (persuasiveness: F( 1,73) = 24.875, p < .OOl; sincerity: F( 1,73) = 11.979, p < .OOl). In other words, confident choices were perceived as more persuasive and more sincere than unconfident ones as were risky choices (compared to cautious ones) on risky items and cautious choices (compared to risky ones) on cautious items.
DISCUSSION
Our evidence strongly suggests that while discrepancies involving own, attributed, and admired choices may be reliable events, they have little to do with a desire to outdo others in value adherence, as assumed by theories of interpersonal comparison.
The first study simply demonstrated that a person tends to be more extreme in his own choice than in the choice he attributes to most others because he is more confident and certain about the former than the latter. The discrepancy, therefore, probably is caused by differential certainty rather than a desire to display adherence. This finding coupled with those in Lamm et al. (1972) , where no relationship was observed between such discrepancies and actual shifts makes the interpersonal comparison interpretation of the difference between own and attributed choice rather tenuous.
The second study examined the interpersonal comparison explanation of the finding that extreme choices (in the appropriate direction) are admired because they exemplify devotion to some widely held social ideal. Or put another way, moderate choices are frowned upon and extreme choices in the disvalued direction are condemned because they exemplify rejection of the value. Given such a hypothesis, it would seem to follow that an expression of great certainty and confidence in the choice should magnify admiration, when the choice is in the valued direction, or condemnation, when the choice is in the disvalued direction. Persuasive-arguments, on the other hand, assumes that an observer in large part judges a choice in terms of how correct or well-founded it is.
In past research this judgement was made on the basis of a single cue, the direction of choice. Since the observer knows to some degree which is the correct course of action, it is not surprising that he applauds respondents with relatively strong preferences for this alternative. In the present study he is given a second cue to the quality of the reasoning underlying a choice: the respondent's certainty and confidence. This should influence his evaluation of the choice-but in a fashion different from that predicted by interpersonal comparison. That is to say, he should have more respect for preferences about which respondents are confident and certain than those about which they are unconfident and uncertain, independent of whether the preference is in the so-called valued or disvalued direction.
Observers' ratings on three semantic differential dimensions give fairly strong support to the persuasive-arguments formulation and not to interpersonal comparison.
Moreover, the two relatively direct, albeit crude, indices of the quality of thought behind a choice-the respondent's sincerity and potential persuasiveness-seems to demonstrate nicely that an observer is evaluating respondents in terms of their problem-solving and not in terms of value adherence.
These findings, along with those mentioned earlier demonstrating that knowledge of others' choice is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for shifts in choice, suggest that interpersonal comparison theories do not provide a tenable explanation of this phenomenon.
